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ABSTRACT
A PRESIDENT’S BEST FRIEND:
U.S. PRESIDENTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH INS V. CHADHA (1983)

By

J. Mitchell Scacchi

University of New Hampshire, May 2022

The legislative veto – a device by which Congress approves or disapproves executive
action on a particular matter – has been one of Congress’s favorite tools for keeping the
executive branch, and all of its departments and agencies wielding increased regulatory and
policymaking power, in check. Since 1983, when the Supreme Court ruled in INS v. Chadha that
the legislative veto was unconstitutional, presidents have been warding off attempts by Congress
to include the device in its legislation, relying principally on their signing statements to voice
their objections. In doing so, presidents invoke Chadha extensively, with no other Court case
comparable in terms of the sheer number of mentions in constitutional signing statements.
Neither the presence of divided government nor each president’s relations with Congress are
correlated with mentions of Chadha. Rather, this phenomenon is an institutionalized practice
characterized by increasing returns and path dependency. As is their inherent desire, successive
presidents have been intent on protecting the constitutional powers of the presidency.
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CHAPTER I

THE PRESIDENT’S FAVORITE CASE:
INTRODUCTION

Upon overstaying his student visa, Jagdish Rai Chadha applied for a suspension of
deportation to remain in the United States. An immigration judge within the executive branch,
acting through the discretion of the U.S. Attorney General, suspended the deportation. In
response, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a resolution vetoing the suspension,
effectively paving the way for Chadha’s deportation. In effect, one house of Congress overturned
the actions of the executive branch without following the constitutionally-prescribed lawmaking
process. With respect to the Constitution’s separation of powers and Presentment Clause, was
this constitutional? Not according to the U.S. Supreme Court in INS v. Chadha (1983).
The Supreme Court found the mechanism described above – the legislative veto – to be
unconstitutional in 1983, but the story of the legislative veto and Chadha did not end there. In
fact, one could argue that it was only just beginning. The following is an examination of the
relationship between the president of the United States and the landmark Court case that ruled on
the legislative veto. Although deemed unconstitutional, the U.S. Congress continued to include
legislative veto devices, like the one described in Chadha, in legislation, and presidents
continued to resist these devices, fighting the battle with signing statements. These statements
coincidentally gained importance during the post-Chadha period as documents through which
presidents increasingly voiced constitutional objections to legislation they signed into law. Thus,
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expressing disagreement with legislative vetoes post-Chadha found a natural home within
presidential signing statements.
This research seeks to answer the following question: To what extent do recent presidents
rely upon INS v. Chadha (1983) as a constitutional defense against the Congress, and why?
Through document and content analysis of 602 constitutional veto messages and signing
statements issued by Presidents Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W.
Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump, we first find that recent U.S. presidents have
employed Chadha extensively in their constitutional signing statements. In fact, they have done
so more than every other Supreme Court case mentioned combined. In explaining this
phenomenon, we find little-to-no correlation between periods of divided versus unified
government and mentions of Chadha or between each president’s relations with Congress and
mentions of Chadha. It appears the best explanation for each successive president’s continued
use of Chadha to combat Congress’s inclusion of legislative vetoes in its legislation is that this is
an institutionalized practice defined by increasing returns, and, more fundamentally, path
dependency, in protecting the constitutional powers of the presidency, an inherent desire of each
president.
Unlike high-profile Supreme Court cases that deal with citizens’ constitutional rights and
liberties, Chadha is a separation-of-powers case with little stardom. However, not only did this
case deal directly with an immigrant’s future in the United States but Chadha has remained in
the political and legal spotlight throughout the nearly four decades since it was decided.
Through this research we gain insight into how presidents interpret the Constitution, how they
employ the signing statement as a unilateral tool of both legislative and executive power
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(affecting how legislation passed by the people’s representatives is ultimately enforced), and
how they wield a Supreme Court case that remains at the center of a constitutional struggle.
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CHAPTER II

LEGISLATIVE VETOES AND SIGNING STATEMENTS:
TWO RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THEIR RELATION TO INS V. CHADHA (1983)

In terms of what it established about the separation of powers and the mechanics of the
U.S. Constitution, INS v. Chadha (1983) is a landmark U.S. Supreme Court case. But has its
value been put to good use by the actors most affected by it? In answering the research question
at hand – To what extent do recent presidents rely upon INS v. Chadha (1983) as a constitutional
defense against the Congress, and why? – existing scholarly arguments and explanations need to
be addressed. In short, they are as follows: Chadha as a critical juncture case; the role of actor
preferences; the increase in legislative vetoes; protecting the constitutional presidency; and the
presence of divided versus unified government. But first, Chadha is best understood within
appropriate context.
At issue in INS v. Chadha was the legislative veto. The legislative veto’s history dates
back to the Hoover administration. President Herbert Hoover wanted to make the federal
government more efficient and Congress granted him the power to reorganize the executive
branch to do so (Ellis 2009, 59). However, in granting this power, Congress also enacted a
provision granting the Senate or the House the power to cancel the president’s actions by a
simple majority vote (Ellis 2009, 59). This became the first of many legislative vetoes. Since this
first legislative veto provision enacted in 1932, there have been over 300 legislative vetoes
included in approximately 200 statutes, implying that Congress considers the veto an important
tool for holding the executive branch accountable (Goldsmith 1984, 749). The legislative veto
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originated as a tool to check the increasing authority delegated to the executive branch since the
1930s by requiring agencies to submit their proposed actions to either a congressional committee
or subcommittee, one house of Congress, or both houses of Congress for approval (Fellows
1984, 1244-45). If disapproved, the agency could not follow through, and this disapproval
typically came in the form of a resolution (Fellows 1984, 1245). Use of the legislative veto
increased in the decades leading up to 1983 (Fellows 1984, 1255). Unsurprisingly, every
presidential administration since Hoover’s has viewed the legislative veto unfavorably,
expressing concerns about its constitutionality in veto messages and signing statements,
eventually leading to it being challenged in court (Ellis 2009, 59-60).
On June 23, 1983, the United States Supreme Court released its decision about the
constitutionality of the legislative veto. At issue was section 244I(2) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act of 1952 (Burger et al. 1983, 919). This legislative veto provision “authorize[d]
either House of Congress, by resolution, to invalidate the decision of the Executive Branch,
pursuant to authority delegated by Congress to the Attorney General, to allow a particular
deportable alien to remain in the United States” (Burger et al. 1983, 919). Jagdish Rai Chadha,
from Kenya, overstayed his student visa in the United States (Burger et al. 1983, 919). After
Chadha applied for suspension of deportation and a hearing, an immigration judge within the
executive branch ordered the suspension, acting in the Attorney General’s discretion pursuant to
section 244(a)(1) of the Act (Burger et al. 1983, 919). The House of Representatives then passed
a resolution in accordance with section 244(c)(2) of the Act vetoing the suspension and ordering
Chadha’s deportation (Burger et al. 1983, 919). Chadha filed a petition for review of the House’s
deportation order with the Court of Appeals, arguing that section 244(c)(2) was unconstitutional
(Burger et al. 1983, 919). The Court of Appeals agreed and this decision was appealed to the
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U.S. Supreme Court (Burger et al. 1983, 919). In a majority opinion written by Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that section 244(c)(2), and all other legislative
veto provisions, are unconstitutional, as they violate the Constitution’s separation of powers and
the Presentment Clause of Article I, Section 7 (Burger et al. 1983, 959).
In terms of Supreme Court jurisprudence and constitutional law, the legislative veto was
no more. The opinion in Chadha was absolute; the legislative veto was ruled completely
unconstitutional in all its possible forms, and Chadha struck down all legislative veto provisions
ever enacted and preemptively struck down all future legislative vetoes (Elliot 1983, 127). It was
the vast scope of Chief Justice Burger’s opinion that made the Court’s decision somewhat
surprising (Elliot 1983, 126-27). In allowing the rise of the modern administrative state, the
Supreme Court had attempted to strike a balance between constitutional rules and practical
accommodations in separation of powers cases (Elliot 1983, 126). However, the Court diverged
from this course in Chadha. Richard I. Goldsmith (1984) argues that the Court made a
purposeful and likely difficult choice, as Chadha was a sweeping decision resting on Article I
rather than Article II rationale, striking down about 300 legislative veto provisions (757). Some
argue that the Chadha decision, in going far beyond the specific statute at issue, disregarded the
practical value of the legislative veto, misread current relations between the executive and
legislative branches, and set impracticable standards for the two branches to follow given the
reality of the administrative state (Fisher 1993, 292). Likewise, although he agrees that the
specific legislative veto at issue in Chadha was unconstitutional, E. Donald Elliot (1983) argues
that the scope of the Court’s decision was too extensive and that the Court instead should have
“reinterpret[ed] the Constitution to create a harmonious new whole” that respects the
Constitution, the existence of the modern administrative state and its delegated authority, and the
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value of the legislative veto (176). Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in the case, Justice Byron
R. White warned that the Court should not have denied Congress its best device for holding the
executive branch accountable after decades of delegating significant authority to the executive
branch (Milkis and Nelson 2019, 475).
When the Supreme Court issues a ruling, it is the job of the other two branches of
government to implement that decision. Yet, the existence of the modern administrative state,
Congress’s desire to exert influence over administrative lawmaking, the effectiveness of the
legislative veto, and the scope of the Chadha opinion all made INS v. Chadha difficult to
implement. Many scholars actually cite Chadha as a decision that was not completely
implemented, some even going so far as to say it was ignored (Wheeler 2006, 1186; 2008, 83).
On the surface, the Court’s decision was clear: the legislative veto is unconstitutional (Wheeler
2006, 1220). In other respects, however, the Chadha decision was unclear. For example, the
severability of a legislative veto provision from the rest of a statute was an issue that frequently
confronted lower courts with minimal clarity from the Supreme Court (Wheeler 2006, 1220).
Additionally, Congress faced a housekeeping problem in the aftermath of Chadha: The scope of
the Court’s decision made it impossible for Congress to revisit and revise every legislative veto
provision ever enacted, which is likely why many have never been touched (Wheeler 2006,
1220). The severability and housekeeping issues made implementing Chadha difficult for lower
courts, Congress, and the executive branch (Wheeler 2006, 1221). Darren A. Wheeler (2006)
ultimately argues that “A narrower decision that did not appear to invalidate all legislative vetoes
and a more detailed discussion of the severability issue generally would have made the Court’s
intentions clearer and facilitated the implementation of its Chadha opinion” (1221). Furthermore,
from the 1930s to the 1980s, the legislative veto was one of Congress’s most effective weapons
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for checking executive branch action, especially with respect to authority delegated to the
executive by the legislative branch (Bottenfield 2008, 1125). Therefore, once it was prohibited
by the Supreme Court, Congress faced a challenge: How could it exercise any control over
executive action (Bottenfield 2008, 1163)?
The answer: The legislative veto would never fully disappear. Although it was
invalidated by the Supreme Court in 1983, the legislative veto, in one form or another, has
remained a congressional tool. In the aftermath of the Court’s decision, Congress continued to
veto administrative actions and dragged its feet removing the veto provisions of many enacted
statutes (Fellows 1984, 1255). Still, the case forced Congress and the courts to consider
alternatives to the legislative veto, and one of the most common of these has been the “reportand-wait” provision, which requires an executive department or agency to report proposed
actions to Congress before enacting them (Wheeler 2006, 1214). Other transformations of
Congress’s veto power include adding limitation riders to appropriations, exerting influence
through investigations, and using its oversight powers to hold hearings, all of which have
generated similar results to the pure legislative veto, such as diminishing administrative
resources, morale, and popular support (Acs 2019, 527). As a result, Congress’s veto power over
administrative policymaking has been significant in the years since the legislative veto was ruled
unconstitutional (Acs 2019, 527). Overall, “Congress began to rely on the use of other statutory
and nonstatutory controls to influence agency behavior” (Bottenfield 2008, 1164). However,
although general agreement exists about its unconstitutionality, the legislative veto was such an
effective congressional device that it makes sense why “in some contexts [Congress] has been
successful in continuing to enact the vetoes” post-Chadha (Bottenfield 2008, 1164). If the
success of Chadha is based on Congress’s subsequent use of the legislative veto, then the
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decision has not been as much of a victory for the presidency as was anticipated (Milkis and
Nelson 2019, 475). In the years since Chadha was decided, Congress has continued to pass laws
with legislative vetoes, typically requiring approval of the House and Senate appropriations
committees for executive action (Milkis and Nelson 2019, 475). In fact, more legislative vetoes
have been passed after Chadha than before (Milkis and Nelson 2019, 475-76).
While these developments with the legislative veto were taking place post-Chadha, a
simultaneous development occurred at the other end of Pennsylvania Avenue with respect to
signing statements and their growing importance. A presidential signing statement is a document
issued by the president when signing a bill into law (Bavis n.d.). Constitutional signing
statements are signing statements in which the president makes constitutional objections to
portions of a bill that he or she is signing. Over the course of the latter half of the modern
presidency – Presidents Ronald Reagan to Joe Biden – the use of the signing statement has been
the subject of extensive debate. The Reagan presidency marks the beginning of presidents
increasingly using signing statements to make constitutional objections to legislation passed by
Congress (Garvey 2012, 1). This practice accelerated under George W. Bush, and consequently
the debate over the proper function of the signing statement reached its peak during his
administration (Cooper 2005; Bradley and Posner 2006; Berry 2009; Garvey 2012).
Signing statements give presidents the last word on legislation, something they have
taken increasing advantage of, and these statements have become useful ways for presidents to
express their opinions about the meaning and constitutionality of legislation (Bradley and Posner
2006, 364; Kelley and Marshall 2010, 183). For example, President George W. Bush made more
constitutional objections in his signing statements than his predecessors, but these objections
were similar to those raised by the men who came before him (Bradley and Posner 2006, 312).
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Some argue that, instead of issuing a signing statement expressing constitutional objections to
certain portions of a bill, the president should veto the bill (Cass and Strauss 2007, 21). But by
raising constitutional objections to legislative provisions in signing statements, the president
avoids having to veto an entire bill because one small provision raises constitutional concerns.
Many scholars support this use of the signing statement instead of the veto. Many argue that
presidents are not required to enforce every provision of every bill they sign into law because the
oath of office and/or the Take Care Clause of Article II of the Constitution do not oblige them to
enforce unconstitutional provisions (Cass and Strauss 2007, 22; Chambers, Jr. 2016, 1189 and
1200). This further stems from the idea that constitutional interpretation is not just the
responsibility of the Supreme Court. Rather presidents are obligated at times to interpret the
Constitution (Chambers, Jr. 2016, 1185). This is especially true for parts of the Constitution that
directly affect them the most, such as Article II and interpretations of executive power (Scacchi
2021, 17). In this way, presidents have discretion over the interpretation of their constitutional
powers and the functions of the executive branch, and the signing statement has been an effective
vehicle for this (Scacchi 2021, 17).
Much of the controversy surrounding signing statements, however, concerns their scope.
“The administration of George W. Bush has quietly, systematically, and effectively developed
the presidential signing statement to regularly revise legislation and pursue its goal of building
the unified executive,” to the extent that the signing statement essentially acted as a line-item
veto in which the president canceled statutory provisions that he did not like (Cooper 2005, 520
and 531). The issue here is that the line-item veto was ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in Clinton. V. City of New York (1998). Furthermore, Bush’s use of signing statements to
raise a wide range of constitutional objections to many legislative provisions made the use of the
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veto unnecessary (Cooper 2005, 531). Bush and others have wielded signing statements as
vehicles of unilateral action through which they furthered their own priorities and interests,
redefined presidential authority, strengthened the presidency in relation to Congress, protected
and increased executive power, transformed the separation of powers, and cultivated the unitary
executive (Cooper 2005, 531-32; Kelley and Marshall 2008, 250, 264, and 265; 2010; Chambers,
Jr. 2016, 1186-87). However, this view is not shared by all. Ian Ostrander and Joel Sievert
(2013) argue that signing statements are better understood as dialogues between the president
and Congress (76). Because they cannot alter the text of laws, do not largely affect how
bureaucracies implement statutes, and often address general interbranch themes as part of an
interbranch dialogue, signing statements are not equivalent to line-item vetoes and do not fit
within the framework of unilateral presidential power (Ostrander and Sievert 2013, 58, 68, and
75).
How are legislative vetoes and signing statements related, and more so, what role does
INS v. Chadha play for recent presidents? Several arguments must be considered. It is important
to first note that Chadha is among a group of Supreme Court cases that directly affect the
American presidency in terms of shaping the office and its powers (Ellis 2009, ix). Richard J.
Ellis (2009) describes the 16 most important cases in this realm of constitutional law: Myers v.
United States (1926), Humphrey’s Executor v. United States (1935), United States v. Nixon
(1974), Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982), Clinton v. Jones (1997), Immigration and Naturalization
Service v. Chadha (1983), Clinton v. City of New York (1998), United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp. (1936), The Prize Cases (1863), Ex parte Milligan (1866), Ex parte Quirin (1942),
Korematsu v. United States (1944), Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), United
States v. Reynolds (1953), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), and Boumediene v. Bush (2008). These
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16 cases cover many areas of interest, including the president’s removal power, executive
privilege, the line-item veto, foreign policy powers, wartime powers, and the legislative veto, all
of which are areas of presidential power that have appeared in veto messages – documents issued
by presidents explaining their reasoning for vetoing legislation – and signing statements (Ellis
2009; Scacchi 2021, 14).
In terms of mentioning Supreme Court cases in writing, signing statements that cite Court
cases often include legal interpretations of bills and cases (Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins, Jr. 2015,
641-42). Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha and Paul M. Collins, Jr. (2015) find that presidents mention
historic cases more often than recent cases, and the former consists predominantly of four
Supreme Court cases: “Brown v. Board of Education (71 mentions), Roe v. Wade (67 mentions),
Engel v. Vitale (31 mentions), and INS v. Chadha (1983) (62 mentions, all written)” (644-45).
Additionally, presidents since Reagan have spoken and written about more Supreme Court cases
than presidents from Eisenhower to Carter (Eshbaugh-Soha and Collins, Jr. 2015, 649). Thus,
there are many Supreme Court cases that are fundamental to the American presidency, and
evidence indicates that INS v. Chadha may be particularly important within this group.
Now to the arguments. First, INS v. Chadha assumes even greater importance when it is
considered to be a ‘critical juncture’ case. Christopher B. Brough (2018) argues that, as a critical
juncture, Chadha created a new jurisprudential regime with a new path to be followed by the
Supreme Court and American political elites in subsequent separation of powers cases (6). As
such, Chadha marked the beginning of the Supreme Court’s renewed role in separation of
powers cases, a development that can be characterized by path dependency and includes cases
such as Bowsher v. Synar (1986) and Clinton v. City of New York (1998) (Brough 2018, 181). As
Paul Pierson (2000) describes it, path dependency is a process “in which preceding steps in a
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particular direction induce further movement in the same direction” (252). An increasing returns
process is one way to understand path dependency, where “the probability of further steps along
the same path increases with each move down that path” (Pierson 2000, 252). These are the
processes identified by Brough (2018).
Second, many claim that the continuing existence and relevance of the legislative veto, in
general, is due to actor preferences. As stated, Congress delegated a significant amount of
authority to executive agencies with the understanding that it could exercise some control over
administrative decision-making with the legislative veto (Fisher 2005, 1). This desire to review
and check executive branch action remained strong after Chadha was decided (Fisher 2005, 1).
Not only has Congress continued to add legislative veto provisions to bills post-Chadha,
especially committee and subcommittee vetoes, but presidents keep signing these bills into law
(Fisher 1993, 288; 2005, 6). On the surface, these presidents have continued to express their
constitutional objections to these legislative veto provisions in their signing statements, writing
that they, for example, “‘will treat them as having no legal force or effect in this or any other
legislation in which they appear’” (Fisher 1993, 288; Garvey 2012, 21). Yet, besides these
presidential signing statements, the executive branch has essentially operated as though the
legislative veto was never struck down (Wheeler 2008, 83). Executive agencies cannot risk these
confrontations with the very committees that authorize and fund their operations, which is why
they abide by legislative veto provisions post-Chadha and have failed to implement the ruling
(Fisher 1993, 288; Wheeler 2008, 116-17). Agencies want to keep their discretionary power and
independence, and Congress wants to check some of this power and does not want to be shut out
of administrative policymaking; therefore, the legislative veto continues to play a role in some
form (Fisher 1993, 292; Wheeler 2008, 116-17).
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To members of Congress, the legislative veto is an invaluable oversight device with
which they are not ready to part, and so they have not (Wheeler 2008, 117). This has actually
served the interests and preferences of both the legislative and executive branches: Congress
delegates discretionary authority to executive agencies if they allow review and control by the
corresponding congressional committees, thus superseding any desire to implement the Chadha
ruling fully and faithfully (Fisher 2005, 6; Wheeler 2008, 83). In sum, Congress has continued to
include legislative vetoes in legislation because, although it expects the president to voice
objections, executive agencies will often comply with such provisions for practical reasons
(Garvey 2012, 22). The president’s objections to such provisions in signing statements can be
understood as both a response to an infringement on the executive branch and as an
announcement of support for agencies that choose to reject such vetoes (Garvey 2012, 22).
Third, Michael J. Berry (2009) argues that the increased issuance of signing statements is
due in part to Congress including an increasing number of legislative vetoes in its legislation
(33). He finds that constitutional signing statements increased greatly under President George W.
Bush (Berry 2009, 3). These statements often targeted legislative vetoes which, as mentioned,
remained in use despite the ruling in Chadha (Berry 2009, 32). As Congress continues to pass
legislative veto provisions, presidents will continue to use signing statements to lessen their
effects on the executive branch (Berry 2009, 33). It can be reasonably inferred that, as a result,
presidents likely mention INS v. Chadha in these signing statements to justify their constitutional
views.
Fourth, many assert that presidents will always seek to protect the constitutional powers
of the presidency and that this will be made clear in their signing statements (Cooper 2005, 53132; Cass and Strauss 2007, 23; Berry 2009, 32; Kelley and Marshall 2010, 171; Garvey 2012, 22;
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Chambers, Jr. 2016, 1186-87). Signing statements, in general, have become important tools for
protecting and increasing presidential power (Kelley and Marshall 2008, 250). This is true for
different presidents of different political parties opposing different Congresses. Ronald A. Cass
and Peter L. Strauss (2007) use the following example to make the point about this particular use
of the signing statement: If Congress passes a large, complex bill with a legislative veto
provision, the president should sign the bill into law, while also expressing his or her choice not
to follow the unconstitutional legislative veto provision (23). The president can support this
position by citing INS v. Chadha in the corresponding signing statement.
Lastly, some point to the presence of divided versus unified government as being an
important factor in the use of signing statements. For example, frequent use of the legislative
veto began in the 1970s by a Democratic Congress to combat President Richard Nixon, a
Republican (Ellis 2009, 59). In terms of mentioning Supreme Court cases, Eshbaugh-Soha and
Collins, Jr. (2015) argue that presidents typically write about Court cases to direct their
implementation under divided government (649). Furthermore, Christopher S. Kelley and Bryan
W. Marshall (2008) find that presidents are more likely to use signing statements on legislation
during periods of divided government – when gridlock hinders the president’s influence in
Congress (264). In the face of partisan gridlock with Congress, modern presidents wield signing
statements as a device of presidential unilateralism – the president taking unilateral action to
protect and advance executive prerogatives, power, and policy (Kelley and Marshall 2010, 171).
However, several factors and conditions influence the particular type of signing statement issued
– whether the president issues a constitutional or simply rhetorical statement (Kelley and
Marshall 2010, 184). Political environment, policy context, ideological differences between the
political branches, and electoral cycle all influence what type of signing statement the president
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will rely on (Kelley and Marshall 2010, 184). In terms of ideological differences, Kelley and
Marshall (2010) find “that constitutional [signing] statements are significantly more likely under
unified as compared to divided government,” likely because Congress will not be as
confrontational (181 and 184). This directly challenges the argument that the president issues
constitutional signing statements to avoid gridlock (Kelley and Marshall 2010, 184).
In sum, scholars argue that Chadha is a critical juncture case, that actor preferences play
a key role in the continued use of legislative vetoes, that increasing legislative vetoes leads to
increasing signing statements, that protecting the constitutional powers of the presidency is a
central goal expressed by presidents in their signing statements, and that the presence of divided
versus unified government influences the use of signing statements generally and the specific
type of statement issued. Each of these arguments proposes a potential explanation for the
phenomenon of interest in the research question: To what extent do recent presidents rely upon
INS v. Chadha (1983) as a constitutional defense against the Congress, and why? This research
builds upon these explanations. Given the relatively recent developments of the legislative veto
and the presidential signing statement, coupled with the many Supreme Court cases that are
paramount to the American presidency, it leads one to wonder whether or not INS v. Chadha
stands out as a salient case in presidential decision-making and constitutional interpretation when
a bill reaches the president’s desk, and if so, why that is.
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CHAPTER III

EXPLORING CHADHA’S ENDURING RELEVANCE

Hypotheses

I attempt to answer both parts of the research question and, in doing so, assess several of
the preceding arguments. I create four hypotheses based on some of the fundamental arguments
presented above as they relate to the research question, dividing them into the two component
parts of the question. With respect to the first part of the research question – To what extent have
recent presidents relied upon INS v. Chadha (1983) as a constitutional defense against the
Congress – the most salient arguments are that Chadha is a critical juncture case and that
increasing legislative vetoes leads to increasing signing statements. Based on these explanations,
I propose the following hypothesis to be tested:
H1: As a critical juncture case and given the increase in legislative veto provisions
enacted by Congress post-Chadha, recent presidents rely upon INS v. Chadha (1983)
more often than other Supreme Court cases in their constitutional veto messages and
signing statements.
As both vehicles through which the president interacts with Congress and clear documentary
examples of the president’s interpretations of the Constitution, constitutional veto messages and
signing statements are the focus of this research. To answer the second part of the research
question – namely why – the simple answer is that presidents invoke Chadha in their veto
messages and signing statements because Congress has continued to pass legislation containing
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unconstitutional legislative veto provisions. However, I seek to pull back the curtain on this
phenomenon and explore what other political realities may be involved. The relevant arguments
to consider include that protecting the constitutional powers of the presidency is a central goal
expressed by presidents in their signing statements and that the presence of divided versus
unified government influences the use of signing statements generally and the specific type
issued. This latter argument implies that relations between the president and Congress could be
of importance. From these explanations, I propose the following hypotheses to be tested:
H2: Since the moment a president first cited the case, it has become common for
successive presidents to issue constitutional veto messages and signing statements that
cite INS v. Chadha (1983) in what is an institutionalized practice best characterized by
increasing returns in protecting the constitutional powers of the presidency.
H3: Recent presidents issue constitutional veto messages and signing statements
mentioning INS v. Chadha (1983) more often under periods of divided government than
unified government.
H4: Recent presidents with negative relations with Congress issue constitutional veto
messages and signing statements mentioning INS v. Chadha (1983) more often than
recent presidents with positive relations with Congress.

Methodology

When presidents are presented with legislation, they can either sign it, veto it, or do
nothing with it (in which case it either passes without his signature or is subject to a “pocket
veto”) (U.S. Const. art. I, § 7). When presidents sign a bill into law, they often issue a
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corresponding signing statement, explaining why they signed the legislation and whether they
have objections to any of its provisions. When presidents veto a bill, they issue a corresponding
veto message to outline their issues with the legislation. Many veto messages and signing
statements contain constitutional objections to portions of legislation. These are known as
constitutional veto messages and signing statements, and they constitute this study’s unit of
analysis. The reasoning for this is two-fold. First, the research question specifically asks how
often presidents use Chadha as a “constitutional defense against the Congress.” Therefore, I am
interested in veto messages and signing statements that invoke the Constitution. Second, prior
research sought to determine how often presidents expressed a constitutional interpretation in
their veto messages and signing statements (Scacchi 2021). This resulted in a collection of only
constitutional veto messages and signing statements, analysis of which led to this project. It is
from there that I continue the research. Thus, this study’s document field was naturally narrowed
to a consistent and well-defined group of constitutional veto messages and signing statements.
To test all four hypotheses, I rely on document analysis and content analysis of 602
constitutional veto messages and signing statements to obtain quantitative data. This set of
documents represents every constitutional veto message and signing statement issued by
presidents since June 23, 1983, the day INS v. Chadha was decided. These presidents include
Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald
Trump. The current president, Joe Biden, is excluded for lack of content. The veto messages are
accessed primarily through the United States Senate’s (2021) website, and the signing statements
(as well as some veto messages) are accessed through the University of California, Santa
Barbara’s American Presidency Project document archive (Woolley and Peters n.d.). Unlike the
veto messages, the body of signing statements might not represent an exhaustive list, but other
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scholars in the field have used the American Presidency Project for rigorous and reliable signing
statement research (See Kevin Evans and Bryan Marshall (2016), “Presidential Signing
Statements and Lawmaking Credit”). I conducted the process of narrowing the document field to
only constitutional veto messages and signing statements, and there might be minimal human
error with respect to the comprehensiveness of the 602 documents examined. However, this N is
large enough for the findings to reveal something of significance.
The document analysis and content analysis entail examining rigorously each of the 61
constitutional veto messages and 541 constitutional signing statements and identifying and
tracking the mentions of INS v. Chadha within them. According to Glenn Bowen (2009),
“Document analysis involves skimming (superficial examination), reading (thorough
examination), and interpretation” in order to collect data in the form of words, phrases, excerpts,
or paragraphs (32). From here, “Content analysis is the process of organising information into
categories related to the central questions of the research” (Bowen 2009, 32). I undertake these
processes here. It is necessary to define what constitutes a mention of Chadha. An explicit
mention occurs when a president cites the case directly, such as “…the Supreme Court’s ruling
in INS v. Chadha” (Bush 2002). Alternatively, an implicit mention of Chadha occurs when a
president heavily implies invoking the Court case, to the point that the president all but directly
mentions it. For example, President Clinton (1994) wrote in a signing statement, “The Supreme
Court has ruled definitively that legislative vetoes are unconstitutional.” This example represents
a mention of Chadha for the purposes of this study, as do phrases and sentences like it, since it is
clear Clinton is referring to Chadha. Both explicit and implicit mentions of Chadha count
equally throughout the analyses.
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Although tracking mentions of Chadha through document analysis and content analysis
will adequately serve the purposes of this study as sufficient methods for testing the four
hypotheses, two hypotheses also require data beyond mentions of Chadha in constitutional veto
messages and signing statements. Testing H1 requires identifying and tracking other mentions of
U.S. Supreme Court cases within the set of constitutional veto messages and signing statements
to compare with mentions of Chadha. Using the “Find” feature of Adobe Acrobat Reader DC, I
search for specific key words in each of the 602 documents. This list of words includes
“Chadha,” “INS,” “veto,” “legislative,” “v.,” “vs.,” “Supreme,” “Court,” “ruling,” “case,”
“decision,” “committee,” and “approval.” Although I conduct this examination thoroughly, there
is always the potential for a slight margin of error. However, the comprehensive list of search
terms makes it unlikely that mentions of Chadha or other Court cases are missed.
Additionally, testing H4 requires a reliable measure of presidents’ relations with
Congress. When a president leaves office, C-SPAN (2021) issues its “Presidential Historians
Survey,” ranking every president according to scores given by historians and presidential
scholars. In addition to their overall rankings, the presidents are given scores for specific
categories, among these being “Relations With Congress” (C-SPAN 2021). These congressional
relations scores were updated in early 2021 after Donald Trump left office, and they range from
15.2 for Andrew Johnson to 83.5 for George Washington (C-SPAN 2021). All six presidents of
interest in this study have 2021 final scores listed for their relations with Congress (C-SPAN
2021). These scores are deemed reliable, as the survey’s 142 participants are well-respected
experts and professional observers of the presidency (C-SPAN 2021). The median congressional
relations score is 52.6 (C-SPAN 2021). For the purposes of this study, negative congressional
relations will encompass any score below the median, while positive congressional relations will
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include any score above the median. Lastly, it is important to note that, in testing the second
group of hypotheses (H2, H3, and H4), I am searching for correlations between mentions of
Chadha and particular political realities, as opposed to determining causation. Establishing
causality would require employing far more extensive methodologies beyond what is possible
with the scope and time constraint of this project.
Like all research designs, this one is imperfect and subject to limitations. An obvious
limitation is the study’s unit of analysis. By concerning myself with only constitutional veto
messages and signing statements, a risk exists that data, specifically mentions of other Court
cases, found in “regular” veto messages and signing statements are excluded from the study.
However, this does not pose a grave methodological issue, as limiting the study’s focus to only
constitutional veto messages and signing statements is a consistent, natural, and well-defined
way to group the documents of interest. Furthermore, the methodologies chosen do not allow for
triangulation of different methods and different sets of data on the same phenomenon. The
benefit of triangulation is its contribution toward enhancing a study’s credibility. With this
research relying upon document analysis and content analysis generating one set of data,
triangulation is obviously not present. This is just the nature of the study; the particular question
asked warrants particular methodologies to arrive at an answer. Although they are most often
used as complementary research methods, Glenn Bowen (2009) acknowledges that document
analysis and content analysis can be employed on their own for specific and specialized cases
suited for such analyses (29). I would argue that this research represents one of those specialized
cases. A scholarly model for using document analysis as the sole research method in political
science can be found in “Presidential Signing Statements and Lawmaking Credit,” where Kevin
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Evans and Bryan Marshall (2016) examine signing statements to identify credit attributed to
lawmakers (757).
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CHAPTER IV

ONE CASE AND SIX PRESIDENTS:
DATA COLLECTION

The data are derived from 602 constitutional veto messages and signing statements (61
veto messages and 541 signing statements) issued from June 23, 1983, the day the Supreme
Court decided Chadha, through the end of the Trump presidency. This includes 102 of Ronald
Reagan’s constitutional veto messages and signing statements 1, and all of George H. W. Bush’s
151, Bill Clinton’s 117, George W. Bush’s 141, Barack Obama’s 23, and Donald Trump’s 68
(see Table 1).2 These totals represent reliable and substantial data sources for the six presidents.
President
Ronald Reagan
(1981-1989)
George H. W. Bush
(1989-1993)
Bill Clinton
(1993-2001)
George W. Bush
(2001-2009)
Barack Obama
(2009-2017)
Donald Trump
(2017-2021)
Total

Constitutional Veto
Messages
20

Constitutional
Signing Statements
82

Total

18

133

151

14

103

117

5

136

141

0

23

23

4

64

68

61

541

602

102

Table 1: Breakdown of constitutional veto messages and signing statements examined

The date Chadha was decided, June 23, 1983, came just over two years into Reagan’s presidency. Thus, the
constitutional veto messages and signing statements Reagan issued from January 20, 1981, to June 22, 1983, are not
considered in this study.
2
These totals of constitutional veto messages and signing statements issued per president are from Scacchi (2021),
“Presidents and the U.S. Constitution: The Executive’s Role in Interpreting the Supreme Law of the Land.”
1
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To evaluate the first hypothesis, I mine this data source for mentions of Supreme Court
cases, including mentions of Chadha. There are 138 mentions of Supreme Court cases across all
602 documents. These 138 mentions are spread across 27 different cases, ranging from Marbury
v. Madison (1803) to Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015) (see Figure 1). With 87 mentions, INS v.
Total SCOTUS Cases Mentioned

Total: 138

INS v. Chadha

87

Buckley v. Valeo

7

The Pocket Veto Case

6

Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock

4

Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC

3

Bowsher v. Synar

3

Supreme Court Cases

Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay…

3

Burke v. Barnes

2

Department of the Navy v. Egan

2

Roe v. Wade

2

Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka

2

Printz v. United States

2

Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority

1

Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo

1

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.

1

Grove City College v. Bell

1

Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism… 1
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.

1

Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust

1

Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio

1

Communications Workers of America v. Beck

1

Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority v.… 1
Marbury v. Madison

1

Franklin v. Massachusetts

1

Edmond v. United States

1

Alexander v. Sandoval

1

Zivotofsky v. Kerry

1
0

10

20

30

40

50 60
Count

70

80

Figure 1: Breakdown of Supreme Court cases cited, June 23, 1983-January 20, 2021
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Chadha is the most frequently mentioned case, while Buckley v. Valeo (1975) and The Pocket
Veto Case (1929) are the second- and third-most frequently mentioned cases, with 7 and 6
mentions, respectively. The 87 mentions of Chadha are divided amongst each president as
follows: 19 mentions from Reagan, 14 from Bush, 13 from Clinton, 39 from Bush, 0 from
Obama, and 2 from Trump (see Table 2). Mentions of Chadha account for 63.0% of all Supreme
Court cases mentioned by the six presidents in their constitutional veto messages and signing
statements, comprising 51.4% of Reagan’s, 46.7% of Bush’s, 68.4% of Clinton’s, 81.3% of
Bush’s, 0% of Obama’s, and 50% of Trump’s total Court case mentions (see Figure 2).
President
Ronald Reagan
George H. W. Bush
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Donald Trump
Total

Total Chadha
Mentions
19
14
13
39
0
2
87

Total SCOTUS Case
Mentions
37
30
19
48
0
4
138

Percentage of
Chadha Mentions
51.4%
46.7%
68.4%
81.3%
0.0%
50.0%
63.0%

Table 2: Number of Chadha and Supreme Court case mentions by each president
Percentage of Chadha Mentions
90%

81.3%

80%
68.4%

70%

Percent

60%

51.4%

50%

50.0%

46.7%

40%
30%
20%

10%

0.0%

0%
Reagan

Bush

Clinton
Bush
Presidents

Obama

Trump

Figure 2: Chadha mentions as a percent of total case mentions, Reagan-Trump
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Beginning with the second hypothesis, it is important to consider the frequency at which
these presidents issue constitutional veto messages and signing statements that mention Chadha.
In addition to the data collected above, this requires collecting the sums and corresponding
percentages of constitutional veto messages and signing statements that mention Chadha from
each president. Seventy-five documents of the 602 examined, or 12.5%, mention Chadha. Of
these 75, all are signing statements except one (a veto message issued by George H. W. Bush),
and 12 of the documents were issued by Reagan, 14 by Bush, 13 by Clinton, 34 by Bush, 0 by
Obama, and 2 by Trump, with their corresponding percentages below (see Figure 3).
Percentage of Constitutional Veto Messages and Signing Statements
Mentioning Chadha
30%
24.1%

25%

Percent

20%
15%
11.8%

11.1%
9.3%

10%
5%

2.9%
0.0%

0%
Reagan

Bush

Clinton
Bush
Presidents

Obama

Trump

Figure 3: Percent of each president’s documents that cite Chadha, Reagan-Trump
The third hypothesis requires calculating the rate at which constitutional veto messages
and signing statements mentioning Chadha are issued during each Congress and cataloguing
whether the corresponding government during those two years is divided or unified. Divided
government exists when one of the three political bodies – the House of Representatives, Senate,
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or presidency – is controlled by a different political party than the other two. Unified government
occurs when the House, Senate, and presidency are each controlled by the same political party.
From 1983 to 2021, there are 14 instances of divided government compared to seven instances of
unified government.3 Forty-four documents citing Chadha are issued under divided government
and 31 are issued under unified government, representing 58.7% and 41.3% of all 75 documents
from Reagan to Trump, respectively (see Figure 4).
Percentage of Constitutional Veto Messages and Signing Statements Issued
During Each Congress That Mention Chadha
40%
34.3%

35%

Percent

30%

26.7%

25%
22.5%

25%
20%

Unified
16.2%

5%

16.7%
Divided/Unified

15%
10%

Divided

9.7% 8.8%

10.8%
7.8%

5.7%

3.5% 3.2%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%

0%

Congress

Figure 4: Percent of documents issued during each Congress that cite Chadha, 1983-2021
Lastly, I collect each president’s congressional relations score, as determined by CSPAN’s (2021) “Presidential Historians Survey,” for the fourth hypothesis. With a median score
of 52.6, three presidents (Reagan, Bush, and Bush) have positive relations with Congress (scores
above the median) and three presidents (Clinton, Obama, and Trump) have negative relations

3

For the 107th Congress (2001-2003), there was unified government from January 20, 2001, to June 6, 2001, divided
government from June 6, 2001, to November 12, 2002, and unified government again from November 12, 2002, to
January 3, 2003.
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0%

with Congress (scores below the median) (see Table 3 and Figure 5). Figure 5 contains the same
data as Figure 3 above, but the presidents are color-coded to reflect their positive or negative
relations with Congress. This particular split is well-suited for this research not only because
there is an even three presidents with positive congressional relations and three with negative
relations but also because each group of three includes two presidents who served two terms and
one president who served one term.
President
Ronald Reagan
George H. W. Bush
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Donald Trump
Total

Relations With
Congress Scores
68.4
55.1
52.2
54.1
46.9
28.6

Positive or
Negative?
Positive
Positive
Negative
Positive
Negative
Negative

Total Chadha
Mentions
19
14
13
39
0
2
87

Table 3: Presidents’ congressional relations scores and Chadha mentions
Percentage of Constitutional Veto Messages and Signing Statements
Mentioning Chadha and Relations With Congress
30%
24.1%

25%

Percent

20%

Positive Relations w/
Congress

15%
11.8%

11.1%
9.3%

10%

Negative Relations w/
Congress

5%

2.9%
0.0%

0%
Reagan

Bush

Clinton
Bush
Presidents

Obama

Trump

Figure 5: Percent of documents mentioning Chadha and congressional relations, Reagan-Trump
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CHAPTER V

ASSESSING THE RELATIONSHIP:
ANALYZING THE USE OF CHADHA

Hypothesis #1

Assessing the first hypothesis – As a critical juncture case and given the increase in
legislative veto provisions enacted by Congress post-Chadha, recent presidents rely upon INS v.
Chadha (1983) more often than other Supreme Court cases in their constitutional veto messages
and signing statements – requires a direct comparison of all the Supreme Court cases mentioned
throughout the presidential documents under consideration. Based upon the data, this hypothesis
as a whole is supported. It is important to note that Chadha is only mentioned once throughout
the 61 constitutional veto messages examined, while the remaining 86 mentions come from
constitutional signing statements. Nevertheless, the results as a whole are overwhelming. Chadha
is mentioned 87 times throughout the 602 presidential documents examined, while no other
Court case has at least 10 mentions. The additional 26 Supreme Court cases are mentioned 51
times combined throughout these constitutional veto messages and signing statements. This
represents a 1.7 to 1 ratio: For every single mention of another Supreme Court case, Chadha is
mentioned nearly two times in constitutional veto messages and signing statements.
Furthermore, INS v. Chadha accounts for nearly two-thirds (63.0%) of all mentions of
Supreme Court cases throughout the 602 documents. For four of the six presidents – Reagan,
Clinton, Bush, and Trump – Chadha represents 50% or more of their total Supreme Court case
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mentions. For the two exceptions, Chadha accounts for nearly half (46.7%) of George H. W.
Bush’s total Court case mentions, and Obama does not mention any Court cases in his
constitutional veto messages and signing statements. Overall, Chadha represents a significant
portion of these presidents’ total Court case mentions. It is by far the primary Supreme Court
case mentioned by the executive when signing legislation into law, with no other case coming
close to its sum of mentions; eighty mentions separate Chadha from these presidents’ second
“favorite” case. Chadha is mentioned 36 more times than all other cited cases combined. It can
confidently be said that these recent presidents under consideration rely upon INS v. Chadha
(1983) more often than other Supreme Court cases in their constitutional signing statements.
Given that the difference between Chadha mentions and mentions of other Court cases is
stark, INS v. Chadha is demonstrably the president’s “favorite” case. That being said, it is
important to acknowledge Chadha’s versatility that sets it apart from many other cases
mentioned by presidents. The legislative veto is a general legislative device that can be included
in many types of legislation, with no relation to the particular policies or topics of the bills to
which they are added. Similarly, Chadha, having ruled on the generic legislative veto as opposed
to a certain policy topic, can be mentioned with respect to a diverse range of bills that include
legislative veto provisions but have no relationship in terms of policy. Several Court cases
mentioned are topic-specific, meaning they can only be included in veto messages and signing
statements about bills that share the same topic as the Court case. For example, Roe v. Wade
(1973) is only mentioned in veto messages and signing statements about abortion-related bills.
This restriction does not apply to Chadha, as it can be cited for a variety of bills with different
topics that include legislative vetoes. However, this fails to account for the significant difference
in sums described above. Buckley v. Valeo and the Pocket Veto Case, the second- and third-most

31

mentioned Court cases, are not topic-specific in that they are both mentioned in veto messages
and signing statements regarding bills of a variety of policy topics.

Hypothesis #2

We now turn to the relationship between these Chadha mentions and relevant variables in
order to determine what, if anything, can help explain the above phenomenon. Rather than
analyzing the sum of mentions, the final three hypotheses can be tested by examining how often
constitutional veto messages and signing statements referencing Chadha are issued.
Fundamentally, we are interested in the frequency of documents citing Chadha from each
president. This way we ensure that the true frequency of Chadha mentions is not inflated by
documents that cite Chadha more than once.
Starting with the second hypothesis – Since the moment a president first cited the case, it
has become common for successive presidents to issue constitutional veto messages and signing
statements that cite INS v. Chadha (1983) in what is an institutionalized practice best
characterized by increasing returns in protecting the constitutional powers of the presidency – in
total, 12.5% (75) of the 602 constitutional veto messages and signing statements examined
contain at least one mention of Chadha. As indicated above, all but one are signing statements,
suggesting again that the observed phenomenon occurs primarily with signing statements. Of
Reagan’s 102 constitutional veto messages and signing statements examined, 11.8% contain at
least one mention of Chadha. This is followed by 9.3% of Bush’s documents, 11.1% of
Clinton’s, 24.1% of Bush’s, 0% of Obama’s, and 2.9% of Trump’s. A relatively steady percent
of documents mentioning Chadha are issued from Reagan to Clinton, followed by a sharp
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increase during George W. Bush’s presidency, and ending with a steep decline during the Obama
and Trump presidencies. Of the 511 constitutional veto messages and signing statements issued
from Reagan to George W. Bush, 14.3% (73) mention Chadha.
These percentages do not tell the whole story. Twelve of Reagan’s examined documents
mention Chadha compared to 90 that do not, which is a ratio of 7.5 to 1: For every constitutional
veto message or signing statement that mentions Chadha, 7.5 do not. For Bush, 14 mention
Chadha and 137 do not, for a ratio of 9.8 to 1, and for Clinton, 13 mention Chadha and 104 do
not, for a ratio of 8 to 1. For Bush, 34 mention Chadha and 107 do not, for a ratio of 3.1 to 1,
while for Trump, 2 mention Chadha and 66 do not, for a ratio of 33 to 1 (all 23 of Obama’s
examined documents do not mention Chadha). The smaller the ratio, the more frequent the given
president issued constitutional veto messages and signing statements with a reference to Chadha;
the larger the ratio, the more infrequent this occurred. The ratio experiences a slight increase
from Reagan to Bush, then experiences a decline during the Clinton and Bush presidencies, only
to increase again through the Trump presidency, as shown in Figure 6.
Number of Constitutional Veto Messages and Signing Statements That
Do Not Mention Chadha for Each One That Does
33

35

Ratio (Value:1)

30
23

25
20
15
10

7.5

9.8

8
3.1

5
0
Reagan

Bush

Clinton
Bush
Presidents

Obama

Trump

Figure 6: Ratio of documents that do not mention Chadha to each one that does, Reagan-Trump
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Between the percent of each president’s constitutional veto messages and signing
statements that mention Chadha and the ratio of each president’s documents that do not mention
Chadha to those that do, a clear increase in frequency is not observed. It is not evident that each
successive president issues documents mentioning Chadha more often than their predecessors.
Notwithstanding, what is evident is that this practice is common from Reagan to George W.
Bush. The percent of constitutional signing statements mentioning Chadha does not significantly
fluctuate from Reagan to Clinton but rather remains relatively steady, followed by an increase in
frequency during the George W. Bush administration, suggesting that some form of
institutionalization has taken place across the four administrations. To refer to Paul Pierson
(2000) again, “In an increasing returns process, the probability of further steps along the same
path increases with each move down that path” (252). This is one conceptualization of path
dependency, the process “in which preceding steps in a particular direction induce further
movement in the same direction” (Pierson 2000, 252). These processes are observed here.
When President Reagan first cited Chadha as justification for his disapproval of a
legislative veto provision in the post-Chadha era, not only did he increase the likelihood that he
would cite the case again in similar future circumstances, which he did, but he also increased the
likelihood that his successor would cite Chadha in defense of the same position, and so on and so
forth. The first step taken down this path set the precedent and the boundaries for future
presidents to continue down that same path and act similarly. The fact that the presidency
alternates between a Republican and a Democrat from George H. W. Bush to Trump, each
predecessor with very different policy preferences and political ideologies than their successor,
lends further support to this hypothesis, as the institutionalized process of increasing returns, or
path dependency, to protect the constitutional powers of the presidency is one reason why such
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different administrations would engage in the same practice. These findings represent evidence
of the institutionalization of this practice within the Executive Office of the President of the
United States and the executive branch from Reagan to George W. Bush through the processes of
increasing returns and path dependency, supporting the second hypothesis.
All that being said, only two signing statements mentioning Chadha are issued over the
entire 12 years of both the Obama and Trump administrations. This represents an
uncharacteristically quiet period compared to the other four administrations considered.
Although President Trump cites the case in two of his signing statements, this decline is likely
the result of Obama and Trump not being faced with as many legislative veto provisions as their
predecessors. However, even if that is true, Obama (two) and Trump (six) identify eight total
legislative veto provisions in legislation without citing Chadha. It is unclear why both presidents
neglect to mention Chadha in these eight instances. This does not mean, however, that the
practice of citing Chadha was never institutionalized during the previous four administrations,
but it does suggest that either the process of path dependency has been broken or these two
administrations represent a fluke in the path that will eventually correct itself.

Hypothesis #3

To test the relationship between divided versus unified government and Chadha mentions
as set forth in the third hypothesis – Recent presidents issue constitutional veto messages and
signing statements mentioning INS v. Chadha (1983) more often under periods of divided
government than unified government – we first find that 44 constitutional veto messages and
signing statements mentioning Chadha are issued under divided government and 31 are issued
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under unified government from 1983 to 2021. Alternatively, 58.7% of all Chadha documents are
issued under divided government compared to 41.3% issued under unified government.
However, this disparity could be due to the fact that, from 1983 to 2021, there are twice as many
periods of divided government (14) as unified government (seven). Thus, much greater
opportunity exists for presidents to issue these documents citing Chadha under divided
government. To address this, we determine the average number of documents mentioning
Chadha issued in a period of divided government and unified government. On average, during a
single period of divided government, the president issues 3.1 documents referencing Chadha.
Conversely, 4.4 documents citing Chadha, on average, are issued during a single period of
unified government. Furthermore, three of the four highest percentages of documents mentioning
Chadha are issued under periods of unified government (1993-1995, 2003-2005, and 20052007). During a single period of divided government, Chadha is mentioned 3.7 times in
constitutional veto messages and signing statements, as opposed to being mentioned an average
of 5 times during a single period of unified government. Not only is the third hypothesis not
supported by these findings but the opposite hypothesis, that recent presidents issue documents
mentioning Chadha more often under periods of unified government than divided government,
appears to be supported. Furthermore, the third hypothesis is most clearly unsupported by the
fact that the highest percentage of documents mentioning Chadha issued during one Congress
(34.3%) corresponds to the 109th Congress (2005-2007), a period of unified government with a
Republican president, Senate, and House.
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Hypothesis #4

The fourth hypothesis – Recent presidents with negative relations with Congress issue
constitutional veto messages and signing statements mentioning INS v. Chadha (1983) more
often than recent presidents with positive relations with Congress – goes one step beyond party
control of the legislative and executive branches to consider the actual relations between the two.
This hypothesis is largely unsupported by the data, with two exceptions. Based on C-SPAN’s
(2021) expert congressional relations scores, the two presidents with the highest rates of
constitutional veto messages and signing statements mentioning Chadha – Reagan and George
W. Bush – each have positive relations with Congress. Conversely, the two presidents with the
lowest rates of constitutional veto messages and signing statements mentioning Chadha – Obama
and Trump – each have negative relations with Congress. These results are the direct opposite of
those predicted by the hypothesis. However, the third president with negative relations with
Congress – Bill Clinton – issued a slightly higher percentage of Chadha documents than George
H. W. Bush, the third president with positive congressional relations. This is the only result in
line with the hypothesis. But to paint an even clearer picture, 15.2% of the constitutional veto
messages and signing statements issued by the presidents with positive congressional relations
mention Chadha compared to 7.2% of the documents issued by those with negative relations
with Congress. Of the 75 documents that mention Chadha, 80% are issued by presidents with
positive relations with Congress, while just 20% are issued by presidents with negative
congressional relations. Furthermore, presidents with positive relations with Congress each
mention Chadha, on average, 24 times compared to an average of 5 mentions from those with
negative congressional relations. These differentials cannot be explained by the presidents with
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positive congressional relations having served more time in the White House than the presidents
with negative relations, as the former served a combined 17.5 years (as the study begins during
the Reagan administration) compared to the latter’s 20 years in office.

Explanations

Two hypotheses are supported and two are unsupported. No apparent relationship exists
between the presence of divided government and presidents mentioning INS v. Chadha in their
constitutional veto messages and signing statements. Nor is there a relationship between
presidents’ relations with Congress and mentions of Chadha. But Chadha is relied upon much
more often than any other Supreme Court case, and this appears to be best explained by the
institutionalization of this practice due to the processes of increasing returns and path
dependency.
It is crucial to acknowledge that the president himself, typically, does not write the
signing statements that are issued by his administration. Presidents have entire legal teams
responsible for putting into words the executive’s thoughts about legislation that reaches his
desk. As White House Chief of Staff (1989-1991) under George H. W. Bush, John H. Sununu
(personal communication, March 10, 2022) “left the signing statements to the legal
troublemakers.” Sununu (personal communication, March 10, 2022) recalled that “Signing
statements are principally (virtually wholly) in the hands of the lawyers. That would include the
President’s legal counsel and extend to the DOJ.” Specifically, the Office of Legal Counsel in
the Department of Justice plays a crucial role in this process. According to Alberto R. Gonzales
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(personal communication, April 18, 2022), former White House Counsel (2001-2005) and
United States Attorney General (2005-2007) under President George W. Bush,
Signing statements are customarily signed off by the Office of Legal Counsel at
the Justice Department, although not all originate there. With respect to routine
matters, or minor legislation that includes provisions which the Executive Branch
wishes to clarify how these will be enforced, then it would not be unusual for
these signing statements to originate at the White House, but again would have to
be approved by the DOJ. As Counsel to the President I only weighed in on
signing statements a few times.
These are the people and the institutions responsible for determining what to include in veto
messages and signing statements.
The institutional factors that guide this drafting process incorporated Chadha
immediately after the case was decided. According to Theodore B. Olson (personal
communication, April 17, 2022), who served as United States Assistant Attorney General for the
Office of Legal Counsel (1981-1984) under President Reagan and Solicitor General of the
United States (2001-2004) under President George W. Bush, “After Chadha came down, OLC
started sending draft[s], which became regularized, over to [the] WH for inclusion in signing
statements whenever legislative veto popped up in [a] bill.” The regularization that Olson
(personal communication, April 17, 2022) describes is the precursor to the full
institutionalization of this practice. This process resembles a machine – the people change, but
the mechanics of the machine do not as they are passed down from one administration to the
next. It becomes regular practice in one administration, as Olson (personal communication, April
17, 2022) recounts, and then it is replicated by successive administrations to the point where the
composition of a president’s legal team makes little difference because the process is in place. As
a result, it essentially becomes automatic for the president and the administration to object to any
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provision resembling a legislative veto and to mention Chadha in signing statements in
accordance with institutional, Department of Justice precedent.
When President Reagan became the first president to reference Chadha as justification
for objecting to a legislative veto provision on July 17, 1984, he created a path. Reagan’s (1984)
administration wrote,
Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Immigration and Naturalization Service v.
Chadha, 103 S. Ct. 2761 (1983), Congress, including committees of Congress,
may not be given power which has ‘the purpose and effect of altering the legal
rights, duties and relations of persons, including... Executive Branch officials...,’
through procedures which bypass the constitutional requirements for valid
legislative action.
This is the template that his and each successive administration would follow. The processes of
increasing returns and path dependency are related to institutionalization in that they explain how
a certain practice becomes entrenched. Each time a president issues a signing statement
expressing disapproval of a legislative veto provision by referencing Chadha, the probability that
the same president and his successor will act in the same manner the next time they encounter a
similar provision increases. Incentives exist to continue this practice. For one, by all indications,
Reagan’s first mention of Chadha did not evoke serious backlash from Congress. Secondly, as
the Supreme Court’s opinion makes clear, the case was decided in favor of the executive branch
and, as Reagan used it, the case is fundamentally a defense of the constitutional powers of the
presidency as the Supreme Court interpreted them under the separation of powers. As the head of
the executive branch, no president would rationally want to discontinue this practice, especially
when it served their predecessors well. This is further supported by the fact that each of the 10
presidents from Hoover to Reagan – five Democrats and five Republicans – disapproved of the
legislative veto device for violating the separation of powers and infringing on the executive
branch (Ellis 2009, 59-60). This same unanimity applies to invoking Chadha, as well. According
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to a former high-level official in the United States Department of Justice who wishes to remain
anonymous (personal communication, April 20, 2022), the practice of citing Chadha is not a
political issue that varies from president to president. In fact, the practice is institutional in the
sense that each administration agrees it is important to protect an institutional value of the
executive branch by setting boundaries and not permitting Congress to infringe on executive
power (Anonymous, personal communication, April 20, 2022). Citing Chadha in appropriate
signing statements can only benefit the occupant of the White House.
Lastly, what makes path dependency such a strong, restrictive process is how difficult it
is to deviate from the path once one president starts down it. This is principally because “the
costs of exit – of switching to some previously plausible alternative – rise” (Pierson 2000, 252).
In other words, predecessors’ past actions influence and constrain their successors’ actions
“because the relative benefits of the current activity compared with other possible options
increase over time” (Pierson 2000, 252). As each administration continues to cite Chadha in its
signing statements, the benefits of doing so – the ability to stand up to Congress and defend the
executive branch under the Constitution – increase and induce each administration to continue
the practice in a self-reinforcing process and positive feedback loop (Pierson 2000, 252). With
every mention of Chadha, the range of alternative options decreases and the path narrows until it
becomes a fully institutionalized process that is triggered automatically when appropriate by the
president’s legal team.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This research supports the claim that INS v. Chadha (1983) is one of the most important
Supreme Court cases in American politics. What began as a dispute over the deportation of
Jagdish Rai Chadha eventually became the case that brought down the legislative veto. With the
rise and growing influence of signing statements, Chadha eventually found a new home in its
journey as a focal point of legislative-executive relations. To answer the following question – To
what extent do recent presidents rely upon INS v. Chadha (1983) as a constitutional defense
against the Congress, and why? – we analyzed 602 constitutional veto messages and signing
statements issued by Presidents Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush, Obama, and Trump. We tested
four hypotheses. In the end, we found that not only is Chadha cited extensively from Reagan to
George W. Bush, but it is mentioned more than every other cited Supreme Court case put
together.
In attempting to explain this phenomenon, no apparent relationship exists between the
presence of divided government and mentions of Chadha nor between presidents’ negative
relations with Congress and Chadha mentions. Neither was the presence of divided government
correlated with an increasing frequency of Chadha mentions from the president, and those
presidents with negative congressional relations did not mention Chadha more frequently than
those with positive relations with Congress. Rather, the relatively consistent frequency at which
presidents issue constitutional signing statements mentioning Chadha is a sign that this particular
practice has been institutionalized by a process of increasing returns and path dependency. When
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the Reagan administration first mentioned Chadha as part of its objection to a legislative veto
provision in 1984, the practice was set in motion, providing both the Reagan administration and
future administrations the template, justification, and benefits for continuing the practice. With
each additional mention of Chadha, the practice became further entrenched, making it difficult
and arguably irrational for any administration to discontinue the practice under appropriate
circumstances. This conclusion is further supported by the fact that the president’s legal team
writes these statements, indicating that the very process of drafting these signing statements is a
product of institutional factors.
As the two elected and fundamentally political branches, the legislative and executive
branches are often at odds with one another. This is especially true in an era of hyperpartisanship and increased polarization. Beyond the media attention, partisan bickering, Twitter
attacks, committee hearings, and impeachment threats, there are constant battles over the
constitutional powers between the two branches behind the scenes. From Hoover to Carter, the
legislative veto was Congress’s favorite check against the executive, and from Reagan to Trump,
Chadha has been the president’s chief weapon against Congress. Decided nearly four decades
ago, INS v. Chadha remains an important part of relations between the president and Congress
and the constitutional struggle between the two. Although it may not be a particularly wellknown case, its impact over the enforcement of certain provisions of laws and continued political
relevance as the most cited case forty years after it was decided are what set Chadha apart from
other cases. Chadha clearly remains significant in American politics.
Overall, the significant use of Chadha in constitutional signing statements is ultimately a
lesson in how certain discretionary actions can become common practice very quickly. From
Presidents Reagan to George W. Bush, constitutional signing statements mentioning Chadha are
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issued at a steady frequency, a sign of institutionalization. Given the realities of the Obama and
Trump administrations, it will be interesting to see how often Chadha is mentioned by President
Biden and his successors. With the frequency of signing statements mentioning Chadha having
dropped significantly during the Obama and Trump administrations, it is an open question
whether or not President Biden and future administrations will have the opportunity to continue
this practice when issuing their signing statements.
Future researchers may continue exploring this topic. There are several questions that
need to be answered. First, a crucial component of the significance of presidents mentioning
Chadha is whether the executive branch abides by the corresponding legislative vetoes as a
result. How many legislative vetoes has the executive branch followed since 1983 despite the
president invoking Chadha when objecting to them? Additionally, given the institutional nature
of citing Chadha, how much institutional turnover has taken place in the Department of Justice,
specifically the Office of Legal Counsel, in the nearly four decades since the Supreme Court
decided Chadha? Answering these questions will further shed light on the importance of the
discoveries made in this study. Besides institutionalization, divided versus unified government,
and congressional relations, additional variables could likely have some relationship with
Chadha mentions, if future researchers decide to test them. Given that this research focused on
cataloguing the Supreme Court cases mentioned from the day Chadha was decided to the
present, future researchers may consider investigating the Supreme Court cases mentioned in
constitutional veto messages and signing statements before Chadha was decided to determine
whether any cases compare to the sum and frequency of Chadha mentions. Examining the
specific types of post-Chadha legislative veto provisions objected to is beyond the scope of this
research but could yield compelling conclusions about how Congress has adjusted to the Chadha
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decision and how presidents have remained stubborn in their opposition to any and all types of
legislative vetoes. Lastly, the Obama and Trump administrations would represent fascinating
case studies within this topic of legislative vetoes, signing statements, and Chadha if future
researchers attempt a closer examination of the decline in Chadha mentions observed, why it
occurred, and whether it is likely to persist.
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SCOTUS Case
INS v. Chadha (1983)
Buckley v. Valeo (1975)
The Pocket Veto Case (1929)
Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock (1987)
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC (1969)
Bowsher v. Synar (1986)
Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, Inc. (1987)
Burke v. Barnes (1987)
Department of the Navy v. Egan (1988)
Roe v. Wade (1973)
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka
(1954)
Printz v. United States (1997)
Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority (1985)
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo
(1974)
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
(1936)
Grove City College v. Bell (1984)
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Company of Puerto Rico (1986)
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (1971)
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust (1988)
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio (1989)
Communications Workers of America v. Beck
(1988)
Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority
v. Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft
Noise, Inc. (1991)
Marbury v. Madison (1803)
Franklin v. Massachusetts (1992)
Edmond v. United States (1997)
Alexander v. Sandoval (2001)
Zivotofsky v. Kerry (2015)
Total Mentions

Total Mentions per Case
87
7
6
4
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
138

Table 4: Breakdown of each Supreme Court case mentioned, Reagan-Trump
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Total Chadha Mentions per President
Total: 87

45
39

40
35

Count

30
25
20

19
14

15

13

10
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0
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Bush
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Bush
Presidents
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Figure 7: Total mentions of Chadha by each president, Reagan-Trump
President

Constitutional Veto
Messages and Signing
Statements
Mentioning Chadha

Total Constitutional
Veto Messages and
Signing Statements
Examined

Ronald Reagan
George H. W. Bush
Bill Clinton
George W. Bush
Barack Obama
Donald Trump
Total

12
14 (1 veto message)
13
34
0
2
75

102
151
117
141
23
68
602

Percentage of
Constitutional Veto
Messages and
Signing Statements
Mentioning Chadha
11.8%
9.3%
11.1%
24.1%
0.0%
2.9%
12.5%

Table 5: Number of constitutional veto messages and signing statements mentioning Chadha
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Congress
1983-1985
1985-1987
1987-1989
1989-1991
1991-1993
1993-1995
1995-1997
1997-1999
1999-2001
2001-2003
1/20/2001-6/6/2001
6/6/2001-11/12/2002
11/12/2002-1/3/2003
2003-2005
2005-2007
2007-2009
2009-2011
2011-2013
2013-2015
2015-2017
2017-2019
2019-2021

Divided or Unified
Government?
Divided
Divided
Divided
Divided
Divided
Unified
Divided
Divided
Divided

President
Ronald Reagan (R)
Ronald Reagan (R)
Ronald Reagan (R)
George H. W. Bush (R)
George H. W. Bush (R)
Bill Clinton (D)
Bill Clinton (D)
Bill Clinton (D)
Bill Clinton (D)

Unified
Divided
Unified
Unified
Unified
Divided
Unified
Divided
Divided
Divided
Unified
Divided

George W. Bush (R)
George W. Bush (R)
George W. Bush (R)
George W. Bush (R)
George W. Bush (R)
George W. Bush (R)
Barack Obama (D)
Barack Obama (D)
Barack Obama (D)
Barack Obama (D)
Donald Trump (R)
Donald Trump (R)
Total Divided
Total Unified
Total

Table 6: Mentions of Chadha during each Congress
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Total Chadha
Mentions
8
5
6
8
6
4
1
1
7
0
10
2
13
14
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
52 (59.8%)
35 (40.2%)
87

Total Chadha Mentions During Each Congress
Total: 87

16
14
14

13
12

12
Divided

Count

10
8

8

8
6
6

Unified

7
6

Divided/Unified

5
4

4
2
2

1

1
0

0

0

0

Congress

Figure 8: Mentions of Chadha during each Congress, 1983-2021
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